1916-07-21-DE-007

1916-07-21-DE-007

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Quelle: /PA-AA/R 20100
Zentraljournal: 1916-A-25959
Erste Internetveröffentlichung: 2017 Juni
Edition: Die deutsche Orient-Politik 1915.06-1916.12
Praesentatsdatum: 07/24/1916 p.m.
Zustand: A
Letzte Änderung: 11/19/2017

„Singapore Free Press“

The Mesopomia Expedition

Signapore, den 21. Juli 1916

The Mesopomia Expedition.

The despatches dealing with the British Expedition to Bagdad, which suffered a serious set back in the surrender of Kut after many months of gallant defence, are far from satisfactory reading. They made it perfectly clear that General Townshend did utter a protest - though it was not in cut and dried terms - when be called attention to the danger of attempting the feat with an inadequately manned and ill supplied expedition. Some critics are inclined to blame General Sir John Nixon, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Mesopotamian Force, but it will probably be found that the disaster was due to the movements being directed from London, by men who had never been near the ground over which our gallant army was advancing, and therefore knew nothing of the difficulties which had to be faced. It was this fatal policy which lost us our North American Colonies and resulted in the formation of the republic of the United States, and unless there is a change there is every likelihood of other disasters happening before victory is finally achieved. Even now it does not seem to be realised that we are up against a combination of Powers whose organisation is the result of many years of preparation on the part of our chief enemy - Germany. The allegations made in the House of Lords in connection with the operation against Bagdad may be briefly summarized. They were: that General Townshend declared on more than one occasion that he had insufficient forces; that the strong objection he had made to the advance had been brought to the notice of she Government of India informally; and that in an important document the General had stated that a move on Bagdad with his then force could only be demanded by persons quite ignorant of the art of war. The White Paper just issued disposes of the suggestion that the advance on Bagdad was dictated by politicians, and proves that wherever the responsibility for the policy adopted rests the gallant General himself had no part in it. It is made clear that the decision to advance rested with Sir John Nixon, who arranged to reinforce General Townshend's Army by two divisions of Indian troops, with which plan the defender of Kut was apparently satisfied. Feeling confident that the support promised would reach him in good time he advanced, only to find, after be had captured Kut and was within a few miles of his goal, that the reinforcements had been kept back. In plain English he was deserted, whether through ineptitude on the part of his superior officer or owing the delay to London remains to be told. Certain it is that the story of the early days of Gallipoli when the Anzacs were similarly situated through the G O C the troops at the base failing to send up his troops at the critical moment was repeated in Mesopotamia, and a gallant little army was sacrificed.

We learn from the correspondence now published that General Townshend had under his command one division, which was already depleted by the losses sustained at Kut, and that he expressed the opinion that if the Government desired him to occupy Bagdad it would be necessary for him to have two more divisions, or one closely supported by another. Sir John Nixon's response was to send only one infantry brigade (4,000 men) and about 600 cavalry, although he intimated that another division was “almost certainly” to be be sent to Mesopotamia. We do not learn when, or in fact whether this extra division materialised, but in any case it never reached General Townshend, or the battle of Ctesiphon might have told a different story. The extension of General Townshend’s communications was precarious, for he knew that Turkish reinforcements would be shortly forthcoming, and he saw the difficulty of defending with an inadequate force an open city tike Bagdad, even if he captured it. With these facts to face, it is hardly surprising that he viewed with gravity the risk of a further advance, and decided to withdraw his forces to Kut. By the time the danger was realised at home the floods had placed a barrier between the hero of Kut and the reinforcing British force, and the Turkish Army had invested the town (U.S. Gazette).